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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : 
v. : 
MARK JOSEPH SERYf : Case No. 860333-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : Category No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction of the 
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, for unlawful 
possession of a controlled substance, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Title 58, Chapter 37, Section 8(2) (a)(i), Utah Code 
Ann., (Supp. 1985) (Addendum A). The appellant was found guilty 
after having pled no contest while reserving his right to appeal the 
denial of his motion to suppress. The Court sentenced him to a term 
of zero to five years at the Utah State Prison. The Court stayed 
imposition of such prison sentence and placed Appellant on 
probation. Judge Uno subsequently stayed the entire sentence after 
issuing a Certificate of Probable Cause pending the outcome of this 
appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On May 22, 1986, William Pearson, a sergeant with the Metro 
Dade Police Department, was at the Salt Lake City Airport conducting 
a training seminar in airport drug detection techniques for twenty 
to twenty-five local law enforcement personnel (T. 5, 50). The 
purpose of this seminar was to instruct local officers as to how to 
carry out detection and apprehension of persons suspected of 
transporting drugs, and to evaluate the need for a drug courier 
detection unit at the Salt Lake Airport (T. 5). Sergeant Pearson 
testified that his usual error rate using his drug detection 
techniques was about ten percent, but while conducting his training 
seminar, the error rate was fifty percent (T. 41, 53). 
At approximately 11:05 a.m., Sergeant Pearson, Mark 
Whitaker, an agent with the Utah State Bureau of Liquor and 
Narcotics and two to four other officers were monitoring passengers 
getting off a Delta Airlines Flight from Florida (T. 24, 42, 50). 
According to Sergeant Pearson, the officers monitored that 
particular flight because Florida is a source of marijuana and 
cocaine (T. 23). 
Sergeant Pearson observed Mr. Sery get off the plane 
carrying a blue vinyl suit case (T. 6). Mr. Sery started looking 
around for his ride immediately after getting off the plane (T. 
67). At that point Sergeant Pearson said, "let's follow him" (T. 
25). Sergeant Pearson did not compare Sery's appearance and 
behavior to a drug courier profile and did not rely on such a 
profile in deciding to follow him (T. 25). The officers followed 
Mr. Sery, ten to fifteen feet behind him, up the concourse until Mr. 
Sery reached a coffee shop (T. 6, 51). Before entering the coffee 
shop, Mr. Sery stopped and looked around. He spent several -minutes 
in the coffee shop then emerged with a cold drink in his hands (T. 
6). 
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After leaving the coffee shop, Mr. Sery walked to a group 
of phones which were directly in front of him. He seated himself in 
a partitioned area and stayed there three to five minutes. During 
that time, he had a receiver at his ear and looked over the 
partition in the direction of the officers, who were standing five 
feet away, two times (T. 7, 45). At least three, and more possibly 
six officers followed Mr. Sery and watched him as he sat in the 
phone booth (T. 45, 50, 51). 
As Mr. Sery left the phone area, Sergeant Pearson, Agent 
Whitaker and at least one other officer approached him and requested 
to speak with him (T. 8). Mr. Sery consented and, upon the request 
of Sergeant Pearson, produced an airline ticket bearing the name of 
Sid Sellow (T. 8). When asked for other pieces of identification 
Mr. Sery told Sergeant Pearson that he had none and explained that 
the airlines had not heard his name correctly and had written an 
incorrect name on the ticket (T. 9). Sergeant Pearson did not ask 
Mr. Sery what his correct name was and did not know his true name 
until after he was arrested (T. 25). Sergeant Pearson asked Mr. 
Sery what his destination was and Sery responded that he was going 
to Evanston, Wyoming. At this time, Sergeant Pearson asked for 
permission to search Mr. Sery's suitcase. Mr. Sery refused to 
consent to a search of his suitcase, and Sergeant Pearson informed 
Sery that he was free to leave (T. 9). 
After releasing Mr. Sery, Officers continued to follow him 
while Sergeant Pearson checked the phone number which Sery gave to 
Delta Airlines when he made his reservations and found that the 
number had been changed to an unpublished number (T. 10). Sergeant 
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Pearson had no information as to when the ticket had been purchased 
or how long ago Mr. Sery had given the unpublished number to the 
airlines (T. 26). 
At approximately noon, a drug detection dog arrived with 
Officer Brook Plotnik from West Valley City (T. 15). Sergeant 
Pearson, Agent Whitaker and another agent approached Mr. Sery, who 
at this time was sitting outside the airport (T. 16) and asked him 
if he would submit his suitcase for a sniff by a drug detection dog 
(T. 17). Mr. Sery declined. Sergeant Pearson then advised him that 
he and his suitcase were being detained, that his bag would be 
presented to the dog, and that it was necessary to go back inside 
the building (T. 17). Mr. Sery got up, picked up his bag and 
accompanied Sergeant Pearson inside. Sergeant Pearson then took 
Sery's suitcase from him, carried it behind the Delta baggage 
counter and placed it in a lineup comprised of four other bags (T. 
18). The lineup was presented to the drug dog who had a positive 
reaction to Mr. Sery's bag (T. 19). Agent Whitaker then took the 
bag, advised Mr. Sery he was under arrest, advised him of his 
rights, and made a cursory search of him (T. 49). 
A search warrant was issued based on Sergeant Pearson's 
affidavit (T. 49). The officers subsequently searched Mr. Sery's 
bag and found cocaine (T. 50). 
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, defense counsel 
argued that the detention of Mr. Sery and his luggage was illegal 
because the officers had neither an articulable suspicion that he 
was engaged in drug activity nor probable cause to justify the 
detention, and therefore evidence obtained as a result of the 
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detention should be suppressed (T. 77). Judge Uno denied 
defendant's motion to suppress (T. 79). 
On July 9, 1986, Mr. Sery entered a conditional plea of no 
contest, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to 
suppress, to one count of unlawful possession of a controlled 
substance, a third degree felony. The Court sentenced him to a term 
of zero to five years at the Utah State Prison. The Court stayed 
such prison sentence on the condition Mr. Sery successfully complete 
a term of probation and pay a fine of two thousand dollars. Judge 
Uno subsequently issued a Certificate of Probable Cause and stayed 
the entire sentence pending the outcome of this appeal. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The officers lacked a reasonable suspicion based on 
specific, objective facts to justify the detention of Appellant and 
his suitcase. Because the officers did not have a reasonable 
suspicion to justify the detention, all evidence seized must be 
suppressed. 
The detention of Appellant exceeded the permissible scope 
of a Terry investigative stop. Because the officers lacked probable 
cause to detain Appellant, all evidence seized from Appellant must 
be suppressed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE DETENTION OF APPELLANT AND HIS LUGGAGE 
FOR THE PURPOSE OF INVESTIGATION CONSTITUTED 
AN UNLAWFUL SEIZURE SINCE THE OFFICERS LACKED 
A REASONABLE SUSPICION THAT HE WAS INVOLVED 
IN CRIMINAL ACTIVITY. 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
protects individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures. In 
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Terry v, Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, (1968), the United States Supreme Court 
established a limited exception to the general requirement that 
officers obtain a warrant, based on probable cause, for all seizures 
of persons. The Court recognized that a police officer may in 
appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner approach a 
person for purposes of investigating the possibility of criminal 
activity even though probable cause to make an arrest does not 
exist. Id. at 22. However, a brief detention, without probable 
cause to arrest, which results in any curtailment of that person's 
liberty by the police must be supported by a reasonable and 
articulable suspicion that the person is engaged in criminal 
activity. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979). 
Article I Section 14 of the Constitution of the State of 
Utah adopts language identical to that of the Fourth Amendment to 
the Federal Constitution. Utah has codified the Terry requirement 
that detention of a person by the police for investigative purposes 
must be based on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Section 
77-7-15 Utah Code Ann. (1953) as amended states: 
A police officer may stop any person in a public 
place when he has a reasonable suspicion to 
believe he has committed or is in the act of 
committing or is attempting to commit a public 
offense and may demand his name, address, and an 
explanation of his actions (emphasis added). 
See also State v. Swanigan, 699 p.2d 718 (Utah 1985). 
In the present case, Mr. Sery contends that Sergeant 
Pearson's detention of him and his luggage outside the Salt Lake 
Airport constituted an unlawful seizure under the Fourth Amendment 
to the Constitution of the United States and Article I Section 14 of 
the Constitution of the State of Utah. 
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In United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983), the United 
States Supreme Court stated that the taking of a person's luggage 
without his consent and submitting it to a drug detection dog 
constitutes a "seizure" for the purpose of the Fourth Amendment. 
Id. at 707. In Place, the Court stated that a police officer may 
briefly detain a person's luggage and submit it to a drug detection 
dog only if the officer has a reasonable suspicion that the 
traveler's luggage contains narcotics. Id. at 706. Taking the 
suitcase from Mr. Sery and submitting it to a drug detection dog was 
a "seizure" under the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and Article I, Section XIV of the Utah Constitution. 
Mr. Sery's person, as well as his luggage, was seized in 
this case. In Terry v. Ohio, supra, the United States Supreme Court 
acknowledged that a brief detention for the purpose of questioning a 
person constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Terry and 
its progeny establish that for the purpose of the Fourth Amendment a 
person is "seized" when an officer "accosts an individual and 
restrains his freedom to walk away." This may be accomplished by 
means of physical force or show of authority. Terry, 392 U.S. at 
16, 19. A person's freedom to walk away must be judged objectively; 
a person has been seized if "in view of all of the circumstances 
surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed 
that he was not free to leave." United States v. Mendenhall, 446 
U.S. 544-545 (1980). 
In the case at hand, Sergeant Pearson and other officers 
approached Mr. Sery a second time while the latter was outside the 
airport waiting for transportation. They had previously approached 
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Mr. Sery and identified themselves as officers, then followed him 
through the airport (T. 8, 10-15). The officers requested 
permission to submit Appellant's suitcase to a sniff by a drug 
detection dog (T. 17). When Mr. Sery refused permission, Sergeant 
Pearson told Mr. Sery that he and his bag were being detained in 
order to present the bag to the drug dog (T. 17). Sergeant Pearson 
and the other officers then took Mr. Sery and his bag back into the 
airport, seated Mr. Sery in a public area, and removed the bag from 
Mr. Sery's presence to submit it to the dog (T. 17, 18). 
In Mendenhall, the Supreme Court listed examples of 
circumstances which might indicate a seizure. Included in the list 
were: 1) the threatening presence of several officers and, 2) the 
use of language indicating that compliance with the officer's 
request might be compelled. Id. at 554. Sergeant Pearson's 
assertion of authority as a police officer in the presence of Agent 
Whitaker and other officers, his express statement that Sery was 
being detained and his confiscation of Mr. Sery's bag, coupled with 
Mr.Sery's reasonable belief that he was not free to leave, 
constituted a seizure of his person and of his property within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 
In order for this seizure to be lawful, the officers 
effectuating the detention must be able to point to specific 
objective facts which caused them to believe Mr. Sery was involved 
in criminal activity. Terry v. Ohio, supra; United States v. Place, 
supra; Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438 (1980). 
In Reid v. Georgia, supra, the United States Supreme Court 
held that Drug Enforcement Agents who observed behavior similar to 
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that exhibited by Mr. Sery could not have reasonably suspected Reid 
of criminal activity. Drug Enforcement Agents in Reid observed the 
petitioner and another man, both of whom carried shoulder bags, 
depart from an early morning flight from Florida. The agents saw 
the petitioner occasionally look backward in the direction of the 
other man as they proceeded along the concourse. When they reached 
the main lobby of the terminal, the second man caught up with the 
petitioner and spoke with him. They then left the building 
together. The Agent approached the two men outside the building, 
identified himself, and asked to see their airline ticket stubs and 
identification. Their tickets showed that they had stayed in 
Florida only one day. According to the agent, the men appeared 
nervous during the encounter. Both men were asked to return to the 
terminal. They did so and consented to a search. Officers found 
cocaine in Reid's bag. The factors on which the agents based their 
belief that Reid might be carrying narcotics included: 1) he had 
arrived from Fort Lauderdale (which the officers claimed was a 
principal place of origin of cocaine in the country); 2) he arrived 
early in the morning; 3) the agent thought that Reid and his 
companion were attempting to conceal the fact that they were 
traveling together; and, 4) the two apparently had no luggage other 
than their carry-on bags. 
The Court concluded that the detention of Reid was 
impermissible because the agent, on the basis of the observed 
behavior of the petitioner, could not, as a matter of law, have 
reasonably suspected Reid of criminal activity. The Court stated: 
Of the evidence relied on, only the fact that the 
petitioner preceded another person and 
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occasionally looked backward at him as they 
proceeded through the concourse relates to their 
particular conduct. The other circumstances 
describe a very large category of presumably 
innocent travelers, who would be subject to 
virtually random seizures, were the Court to 
conclude that as little foundation as there was 
in this case could justify a seizure. Nor can we 
agree, on this record, that the manner in which 
the petitioner and his companion walked through 
the airport reasonably could have led the agent 
to suspect them of wrongdoing. (Emphasis 
added.) Id. at 441. 
The behavior exhibited by Mr. Sery, and relied upon by 
Sergeant Pearson and Agent Whitaker to justify Mr. Sery's detention 
is indistinguishable from the type of behavior found by the United 
States Supreme Court to be insufficient to warrant a detention in 
Reid. Sergeant Pearson was at the Salt Lake Airport, conducting a 
training session for more than twenty officers in techniques for 
detecting persons transporting drugs (T. 5, 50). Sergeant Pearson 
and several of the officers monitored Mr. Sery's flight from Florida 
because, according to the Sergeant, Florida is a source of cocaine 
and marijuana (T. 23). 
Sergeant Pearson testified that he usually had a success 
rate of ninety percent using his airport training techniques. 
However, while teaching local officers, Sergeant Pearson had a 
success rate of only fifty percent (T. 41). Sergeant Pearson was 
searching for subjects to use as part of his training; a large 
potential to approach, question and investigate innocent persons on 
less than a reasonable suspicion and to otherwise violate Fourth 
Amendment and Article I, Section 14 rights exists under such a 
situation. 
Sergeant Pearson observed Mr. Sery looked around as he got 
off the plane, and told the others "Let's follow himn (T. 25). 
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Based on his arrival from Florida and his looking around upon entry 
into the terminal, Mr. Sery became the focus of several officers1 
attention. While the record as to how many men followed and 
apprehended Mr. Sery is slightly confusing, it appears that at leas 
three, and more probably six, men followed Mr. Sery from the gate 
(T. 45, 50, 51). 
After leaving the gate, Mr. Sery went to a coffee shop and 
bought a cold drink. Before entering the coffee shop, he looked 
around. This behavior is not inconsistent with that of an arriving 
passenger who expects someone to meet him (T. 6, 51). 
Mr. Sery exited the coffee shop and walked directly to a 
bank of pay phones. He was at the phones three to five minutes (T. 
7, 45). Sergeant Pearson focused on Mr. Sery's behavior in looking 
over the partition two times during that three to five minutes as 
being suspicious behavior. Such behavior is not unusual for an 
individual expecting a person to pick him up. In addition, where 
six men have been following an individual for several minutes and 
stand five feet away watching that person, glancing at the group 
twice during a phone call of several minutes is not unusual or 
suspicious behavior. 
Sergeant Pearson stated that Mr. Sery exited the phone are 
in an unusual manner. However, choosing to exit the phone booth so 
as not to have to walk next to several men who are staring at him i 
not unusual behavior for an individual, regardless of his guilt or 
innocence. 
The officers approached Mr. Sery as he left the phone 
area. At this point, the officers did not have a reasonable 
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suspicion, based on specific articulable facts, that Mr. Sery was 
carrying narcotics. In fact, Sergeant Pearson testified that Mr. 
Sery's behavior was not inconsistent with that expected of an 
incoming passenger at the airport (T. 31). The officers spoke 
briefly with Mr. Sery, then let him proceed. 
During this initial stop, the officers asked to see Mr. 
Sery's ticket. He showed them his ticket, bearing the name of Sid 
Sellow and told them the airlines had not heard his name correctly 
and had made an error issuing the ticket (T. 9). The officers also 
asked Mr. Sery if he would consent to a search of his luggage. 
Sergeant Pearson testified that Sery's refusal of such consent was 
one of the factors giving rise to a reasonable suspicion that he was 
involved in criminal activity. Citizens in this country have a 
right to refuse to let officers search their possessions or homes. 
While refusing consent may make officers think that their hunch or 
intuition is correct, it is not an articulable fact upon which a 
reasonable suspicion can be based. 
The officers did not ask Mr. Sery his true name and did not 
know his correct name until after the second stop, when they placed 
him under arrest. Because the officers did not know Mr. Sery's true 
name, they had no information on which to determine the similarity 
between the name on the ticket and Sery's correct name or on which 
to determine whether Mr. Sery's explanation that the airline had not 
heard his name correctly was reasonable. Without ascertaining Mr. 
Sery's true name, the incorrect name on the ticket coupled with Mr. 
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Sery's explanation does not amount to an articulable fact giving 
rise to a suspicion that Mr.Sery was involved in criminal activity. 
After the initial stop, Sergeant Pearson checked the phone 
number Mr. Sery had given Delta Airlines and discovered that it was 
unpublished (T. 9). Sergeant Pearson did not check out when Mr. 
Sery purchased the ticket or when he gave the number to the 
airlines. The Sergeant offered no testimony as to why an 
unpublished number would make him suspicious. Many individuals in 
our society have unpublished numbers. To say that giving an 
unpublished number to an airlines when traveling gives rise to a 
reasonable suspicion that the person was transporting drugs would 
give the government license to stop numerous innocent individuals. 
Neither Sergeant Pearson nor any of the other officers 
related Mr. Sery's behavior or appearance to a drug courier profile 
(T. 25). While Sergeant Pearson did explain that he considered 
Florida a source of cocaine and marijuana, he did not explain why an 
unlisted phone number, incorrect name or staring at officers would 
give rise to a suspicion. Officers in this case were involved in a 
training seminar where they needed subjects to interview. They had 
a hunch Mr. Sery might be carrying drugs and followed up on it. The 
information in their possession did not amount to a reasonable 
suspicion based on articulable facts. Because the seizure of the 
luggage and Mr. Sery was in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and Article I, Section XIV of the Utah 
Constitution, all evidence that flowed from that seizure must be 
suppressed. (Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). 
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POINT IL THE OFFICERS DID NOT HAVE PROBABLE CAUSE 
TO ARREST THE APPELLANT, 
The general rule under the Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and Article I Section XIV of the Utah 
Constitution is that officers must have probable cause to believe 
the individual committed a crime in order to seize that person. See 
Terry v. Ohio, supra; Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 499 (1983). 
As previously outlined, in Terry v. Ohio, supra, the United States 
Supreme Court carved a limited exception to that rule, allowing 
officers to briefly detain individuals for investigatory purposes 
where such officers have a reasonable suspicion that criminal 
activity is afoot. However, where the detention of an individual 
exceeds the limits of a Terry investigatory stop, officers must 
still have probable cause in order to justify the detention. 
Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979); Florida v. Royer, supra; 
United States v. Place, supra. 
In Florida v. Royer, supra, officers who observed the 
defendant nervously pay cash for his airline ticket and believed 
that his charactistics fit a "drug courier profile" approached the 
defendant. Upon request, but without verbal consent, the defendant 
produced his airline ticket and driver's license which bore 
different names. The detectives informed the defendant that they 
were narcotics agents and that they suspected him of transporting 
narcotics. Without returning his airline ticket or driver's license 
the agents asked the defendant to accompany them to a small room 
about forty feet away. One of the agents retrieved defendant's 
luggage from the airline, without the consent of the defendant, and 
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brought it to the room. When asked permission to search his 
luggage, the defendant did not verbally consent but unlocked one of 
his suitcases in which the officers found marijuana. The agents 
then told the defendant he was under arrest. 
The United States Supreme Court concluded that when the 
detectives identified themselves as narcotic agents, told the 
defendant they suspected him of transporting narcotics, took away 
his airline ticket and driver's license and asked him to accompany 
them to the police room without telling him he was free to leave, 
the defendant was seized for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. The 
Court found that the agent's detention of the defendant constituted 
a more serious intrusion on his personal liberty than is allowable 
on mere suspicion of criminal activity, that his detention amounted 
to an arrest, and that the agents lacked the requisite cause to 
arrest. The factors relied on by the agents to detain the 
defendant, his nervousness, the fact that he paid cash for his 
ticket, and the fact that he used an assumed name were insufficient 
to provide the officers with probable cause to arrest. Since no 
probable cause to arrest existed at the time the defendant consented 
to a search of his luggage, his consent was tainted by the illegal 
arrest and evidence discovered from that search was suppressed. 
In United States v. Place, supra, the United States Supreme 
Court held that the detention of the defendant's luggage exceeded 
the permissible scope of a Terry stop. In that case, Drug 
Enforcement Agents seized the defendant's bags after he refused to 
consent to a sniff test based on the defendant's behavior while 
standing in line, different addresses on the luggage tags, and the 
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statement by defendant that he knew they were police officers. The 
agents told Mr. Place he was free to go, but failed to inform him as 
to how long he would be dispossessed of his luggage, where his 
luggage would be or what arrangements could be made for the return 
of the luggage. The agents held the bags for ninety minutes, during 
which they submitted them to a drug detection dog for a sniff test. 
The dog responded positively and agents subsequently found cocaine 
in the bags. 
The Place court noted that the seizure of possessions can 
be tantamount to the seizure of a person, infringing on a liberty as 
well as possessory interest, where the individual is not informed of 
when or where his luggage will be returned. United States v. Place, 
supra at 121-122. 
Particularly in the case of detention of luggage 
within the traveler's immediate possession, the 
police conduct intrudes on both the suspect's 
possessory interest in his luggage as well as his 
liberty interest in proceeding with his 
itinerary. The person whose luggage is detained 
is technically still free to continue his travels 
or carry out other personal activities pending 
release of the luggage. Moreover, he is not 
subjected to the coercive atmosphere of a 
custodial confinement or to the public indignity 
of being personally detained. Nevertheless, such 
a seizure can effectively restrain the person 
since he is subjected to the possible disruption 
of his travel plans in order to remain with his 
luggage or to arrange for its return. (Emphasis 
added). 16^ at 121-122. 
In the present case, the officers' detention of Mr. Sery 
and his bag exceeded the permissible scope of a Terry stop. The 
officers initially approached Mr. Sery and identified themselves. 
They then asked to search Mr. Sery's bag. When he declined, they 
told him he was free to leave (T. 8-9). However, they continued to 
follow him. 
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Sergeant Pearson and at least one other officer/ Agent 
Whitaker, later approached Mr. Sery as he was sitting outside the 
airport (T. 16). They asked Mr. Sery if he would submit his bag to 
a drug detection dog. When Mr. Sery declined consent, Sergeant 
Pearson informed him that both he and the bag were being detained 
and forced him to return to inside the terminal (T. 17). This 
detention was similar to that in Royer—Officers identifying 
themselves force the defendant to move to another location in order 
to further inspect his luggage. While Sery was not taken to a room 
as the defendant in Royer was, he was nevertheless confined in the 
terminal and subjected to the "public indignity of being personally 
detained." See United States v. Place, supra at 121-2. 
The confinement or detention in this case exceeded that in 
Place since the defendant, not just his luggage, was directly 
detained. The defendant was not told how long he or his bag would 
be detained nor when or if he would be released or get his luggage 
back (T. 17-18). He was forced to move inside by at least three 
officers and subjected to the "coercive atmosphere of custodial 
confinement." Because the confinement of Mr. Sery exceeded the 
limits of a Terry investigative stop, the officers should have had 
probable cause to detain him in this manner. 
In Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949) the 
Supreme Court established that probable cause means more than a bare 
suspicion. Probable cause exists where facts and circumstances 
within the officer's knowledge are sufficient to lead a reasonably 
prudent person to believe that an offense has been or is being 
committed. 
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In the present case, the officers did not have probable 
cause to believe Mr. Sery had committed a crime. Sergeant Pearson 
detained the Appellant because he looked nervous when he got off the 
plane, looked over at Sgt. Pearson and the officers accompanying him 
while making a phone call, exited the phone booth in an unusual 
manner, refused to consent to a search of his suitcase, and provided 
the airlines with a call-back phone number which was unpublished (T. 
21, 37-38). The sergeant had not found any drugs nor had any 
specific indication that Sery possessed drugs when he detained Mr. 
Sery and based his decision to seize Mr. Sery only on a hunch that 
there were drugs in his bags. The Royer Court stated that "not 
every nervous young man paying cash for a ticket to New York City 
under an assumed name and carrying two heavy American Tourister bags 
may be arrested and held to answer for a serious felony charge." 
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. at 243. The behavior relied on by the 
officers to detain Mr. Sery is characteristic of that exhibited by 
typical passengers at an airport and is less suggestive of criminal 
activity than the behavior which the Royer court found was 
insufficient to justify an arrest. 
Since Mr. Sery was illegally detained when his luggage was 
submitted to the narcotic detection dog, the evidence obtained as a 
result of that search is tainted by the illegal detection and must 
be suppressed. 
CONCLUSION 
For any or all of the foregoing reasons, the Appellant, 
Mark Sery, requests that this Court suppress the evidence seized 
from his luggage, and reverse his conviction for possession of 
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controlled substance and remand this case to the trial court with an 
order for either dismissal of the charges or a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted this (d day of May, 1987. 
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ADDENDUM A 
Utah Code Ann. 58-37-8(2)(a)(i)(1985 supp): 
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally 
to possess or use a controlled substance, 
unless it was obtained under a valid 
prescription or order or directly from a 
practitioner while acting in the course of 
his professional practice, or except as 
otherwise authorized by this subsection; 
